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Post-conflict land governance reform in the African Great Lakes region 
Part I – The challenges of post-conflict land reform 
 
 
Disputes over land are a prominent feature of many 
situations of protracted violent conflict in Burundi, 
Uganda and South Sudan. Research conducted as 
part of the programme ‘Grounding Land Govern-
ance’ underscores that war reshuffles access and 
ownership, but also critically changes the ways in 
which land is governed. Land issues often come to 
resonate with other conflicts in society, thereby 
affecting overall stability. This makes interventions 
in land governance politically sensitive. While in-
tended to improve land governance practices, re-
forms often result in unintended and unpredictable 
outcomes, and have significant impacts for the le-
gitimacy of the state. We therefore conclude that 
land governance in post-conflict settings deserves 
particular attention from academics and policymak-
ers. 
The second part of this infosheet discusses de-
centralization, which is a prominent feature of re-
form programmes throughout the region. Our stud-
ies found that transferring responsibilities for land 
administration and dispute resolution to local gov-
ernment and non-state institutions may indeed 
enhance the protection of local properties and re-
duce land-related conflicts. Likewise, it may fuel 
existing power struggles, or effectively enhance the 
power of the state. Policymakers should therefore 
not have too high expectations about the ability of 
decentralization to enhance local tenure security. 
 
Local council court judging a land dispute, Yei river 
County, South Sudan 
 
The pertinence of land disputes in post-conflict 
settings 
Research conducted as part of the programme 
‘Grounding Land Governance’ makes clear that 
disputes over land are a prominent feature of many 
situations of protracted violent conflict. Case stud-
ies in Burundi, Uganda and South Sudan underscore 
that violent conflict often has significant impact on 
land access. During conflict, land is misappropriat-
ed, while displacement and (partial) return give rise 
to competing claims to land. The transition from 
war to peace ignites old and new claims and may 
provide a window of opportunity for irregular ac-
quisitions of land, further weakening the entitle-
ments of vulnerable groups in society. After conflict, 
land disputes are a politically sensitive issue, and 
may create instability and even result in new out-
breaks of violence. 
However, violent conflict not only reshuffles ac-
cess and ownership, but critically alters the ways in 
which land is governed. Violent conflict tends to 
erode the capacity of state and local institutions to 
deal with land disputes, and calls into question the 
legitimacy of land governing authorities and the 
rules applied. Through violence, new tenure ar-
rangements may be enforced or promoted, while 
reform programmes may introduce equally con-
tested ways of governing land.  
Critical in this regard is that conflict around land 
often relates to other contestations in society. Dis-
putes about land access and control may be locally 
understood as reflecting more general inequalities 
in the distribution of resources, development, and 
decision-taking power between different (ethnic) 
groups; or between elites and those without the 
necessary connections to the state. Frequently, 
disputes about land are linked to questions of citi-
zenship and ethnic belonging. Framing the resulting 
disputes as ‘land-dispute’ may, in fact, hide the 
complex and changing nature of issues involved.1 
                                                 
1  Mathijs van Leeuwen & Gemma van der Haar 
(2016) ‘Theorizing the Land–Violent Conflict 
Nexus’, World Development, 78(Feb.2016):94–104. 
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Due to these complexities, addressing land is-
sues in (post-)conflict situations is not only perti-
nent, but also politically sensitive. Often, govern-
ments and donors feel an urge to transform tenure 
arrangements so as to enhance local tenure securi-
ty, reduce conflict, and improve agricultural produc-
tion. Yet, the ways in which reforms reorganize land 
tenure, deal with displacement-related disputes, 
past grievances and irregular appropriations, and go 
about new demands for land by investors are often 
highly contested. While land governance reform 
may enhance tenure security of particular groups, it 
may also fuel (ethnic) tensions, or grievances about 
those in power and the institutions that govern 
natural resources, thus posing a threat to post-
conflict stability.  
 
Local council court judging a land dispute, Mbarara 
District Uganda 
 
In the research programme we encountered a 
variety of reform strategies, including decentraliza-
tion, efforts at acknowledging customary tenure, 
formalization of land ownership, and the promotion 
of women’s rights to land. Yet, rather than contrib-
uting to clear and transparent land governance 
practice, reform programmes tend to result in insti-
tutional multiplicity and competition. Reforms often 
lead to the creation of new, parallel institutions, 
while land governing responsibilities of different 
institutions are not spelled out, and newly intro-
duced norms may remain ambiguous or contested. 
This fuels competition between state and non-state 
institutions and the rules they apply. This contrib-
utes little to enhancing tenure security. Instead, 
particular groups of people – widows, divorced 
women, and orphans – tend to fall away as they are 
unequipped to navigate through this institutional 
multiplicity. It may also result in many disputes 
never being solved, as is the case in Burundi, be-
cause people may always proceed to another insti-
tution, and judgements are never final. 
In many of the cases studied, efforts at reform-
ing land governance tend to touch upon the process 
of local state formation.2 Land governance is a key 
issue at the local level where local people meet 
their authorities. The ways in which those authori-
ties deal with land-related problems strongly im-
pacts their legitimacy and authority within those 
communities. Reforms tend to reshuffle responsibil-
ities between state and non-state institutions, and 
may introduce new regulations and conventions to 
deal with land claims and disputes. At the same 
time, reforms may alter expectations people have 
of the state and other forms of public authority. 
This may contribute to the legitimacy of those au-
thorities, but also result instead in distrust, and 
perceptions of (ethnic) bias of land governance 
against certain communities, thus increasing insta-
bility. 
 
Deceptive decentralization - the unpredictability of 
land reform  
A popular strategy for reforming and enhancing 
land governance and improving land tenure security 
of small-scale farmers is administrative decentrali-
zation. Through decentralization, responsibilities for 
administering land and resolving disputes are trans-
ferred to existing or newly established local state or 
non-state authorities, traditional institutions, and 
civil society. Decentralization is believed to contrib-
ute to more accessible and effective land services 
delivery and thus more tenure security, while it 
would also empower local resource users in deci-
sion taking on their assets. Decentralization is a key 
strategy in international efforts at (post-conflict) 
state building, as it would promote democratiza-
tion, and re-establish the so-called ‘social contract’ 
between a state and its citizens. However, a grow-
ing literature points out that, in practice, decentrali-
zation often fails to result in the benefits expected.  
All case studies conducted as part of ‘Grounding 
Land Governance’ in one way or the other ad-
dressed the question of how decentralization of 
land services provision actually works out, and how 
it impacts the accountability and legitimacy of local 
land governing institutions. Overall, the case studies 
emphasized that decentralization can have varie-
gated results, both positive and negative. 
Our studies confirm other analyses that point 
out how decentralization programmes are often 
                                                 
2  Mathijs van Leeuwen (2016) ‘Localizing Land Gov-
ernance, Strengthening the State; Decentralization 
and Land Security of Tenure in Uganda’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change. 
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ineffective, due to implementation failures and 
capacity problems, such as a lack of qualified people 
to fulfil different roles in decentralized governance, 
and limited finances available for decentralized 
structures. For instance, local government in Ugan-
da lacks capacities for redistributing land or giving 
adequate compensation, while it is often unclear 
who precisely is in charge. An increase in the num-
ber of civil servants may also imply an increase in 
bribes and transaction costs. Responsibilities for 
land governance tend to be fragmented and dis-
persed over the bureaucracy, adding to the ineffec-
tiveness of reforms. 
 
Posters for elections of local councils, Mbarara Distict 
Uganda 
 
A critical question is to what extent decentraliza-
tion enhances local participation in decision taking 
on land. Our research in Uganda evidenced that 
decentralization can enhance participation of wom-
en and youth in land governance. At the same time, 
it often fails to effectively assure participation by 
common citizens, and instead results in the capture 
of local government by powerful elites. Different 
case studies in Uganda illustrate how decentraliza-
tion allows the state and its representatives to in-
fringe upon resource rights of its people. In a large-
scale acquisition of land in Amuru District, decen-
tralized authorities were more responsive to the 
demands of higher level government than to local 
citizens.3  
Several of our studies reveal how decentraliza-
tion adds on to institutional multiplicity and confu-
sion about who determines what land governing 
roles and what rules apply. This may result in com-
petition among state and non-state authorities 
                                                 
3  Doreen Kobusingye (forthcoming) ‘Decentralization 
and Power Complexities in Large Scale Land Alloca-
tions: The Case of Amuru Sugar Project in Uganda’. 
about responsibilities and regulations. For instance, 
in south-west Uganda, rather than strengthening 
local mechanisms for securing tenure, the reforms 
introduce new forms of tenure insecurity, fail to 
transform local conventions of dealing with land 
disputes, and delegitimize local mechanisms for 
securing tenure. Local power holders manage to use 
this institutional multiplicity to their advantage, 
while the poor, and widowed and divorced women, 
often lose out from institutional negotiability.4 
Decentralization is often a political project to 
garner local support and entice constituents. In the 
case of Uganda, we observed a process of ongoing 
‘districtification’, with the creation of districts being 
part of electoral strategies: new districts are specifi-
cally created in regions where support to the sitting 
government is higher, while new districts are also 
appreciated for the new jobs and opportunities for 
patronage they represent.5 In Burundi, accusations 
circulated that appointed administrators in the new 
structures belonged to one ethnic group. While 
paying lip-service to increased participation and 
doing away with previous practices of authoritarian 
governance, powers are given without rights, fi-
nances and real decision-taking authority. 
At the same time, in a post-conflict setting, de-
centralization may serve as an effective tool to 
(re)consolidate the hegemony of the state. In Bu-
rundi, policies of decentralization in fact come 
down to recentralization, and rather appear to en-
hance central state control of what is happening at 
the local level. Moreover, instead of enhancing local 
participation in decision taking within the land sec-
tor, it appears that donors indirectly contribute to 
consolidate the role and power of the central state 
through the funding of programmes to expand a 
decentralized land registration system within local 
communities.6 In Uganda, decentralization policies 
effectively reinforce state presence at the local 
level. Through decentralization the state manages 
to position itself as the central player in defining 
land tenure and safeguarding tenure security, de-
creasing the relevance of local, non-state land gov-
                                                 
4  Mathijs van Leeuwen (2014) ‘Renegotiating cus-
tomary tenure reform – Land governance reform 
and tenure security in Uganda’, Land Use Policy, 
7(39):292–300. 
5  See, for instance, Doreen Kobusingye (forthcom-
ing) ‘The Multifaceted Relationship between Land 
and Violent Conflict: The case of Apaa Evictions in 
Amuru district, Northern Uganda’ 
6  Fieldwork Rosine Tchatchoua Djomo 
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ernance, if not defying their legitimacy.7 Likewise, in 
South Sudan, pre-conflict land governing structures 
have been destroyed, and while chiefs have 
(re)gained a role in decentralized government, oth-
er forms of customary authority are effectively side-
lined.8 
In a post-conflict setting, decentralization also 
comes down to reordering power relations between 
communities. In South Sudan, decentralization 
changes administrative boundaries and responsibili-
ties in land governance, e.g. through the creation of 
sub-districts. Sometimes, such re-division is seen to 
promote the interests of one of these communities, 
and hence the success or failure of decentralization 
depends on which community gets what and who is 
put into power. In Yei and Juba, the redrawing of 
boundaries and responsibilities fuels disputes about 
boundaries between ethnic communities and about 
who is in charge of the lands within the newly cre-
ated administrative units. Such disputes may start 
as local conflicts, but have the potential to escalate 
into wider conflicts, as was the case with conflicts 
between the Bari and Mundari that started around 
2009.9 Likewise, district creation in Uganda happens 
along ethnic lines, which creates disputes about the 
precise locality of those boundaries. This takes 
place within a context of a ‘history of bordering’ 
and colonial projects of defining the boundaries of 
ethnic communities. Territorial boundaries that had 
been agreed upon in the past are again called into 
question and infringed upon by the state. 
 
Recommendations 
• Given the prominence of disputes around land in 
Burundi, Uganda and South Sudan, and the politi-
cal importance and sensitivity of land governance 
reforms, in situations of protracted violent conflict 
land governance and its reform deserves particular 
attention from academics and policymakers. 
• Policymakers should not have too high expecta-
tions of the ability of decentralization to enhance 
local tenure security. Donors should be careful 
about the ambitions of those promoting decentral-
ization: to what extent is decentralization about a 
                                                 
7  Mathijs van Leeuwen (2016) ‘Localizing Land Gov-
ernance, Strengthening the State; Decentralization 
and Land Security of Tenure in Uganda’, Journal of 
Agrarian Change. 
8   Marlie van de Kerkhof, Mathijs van Leeuwen & 
Yves van Leynseele (forthcoming) ‘Reopening 
property relations, reordering the state in South 
Sudan’ 
9  Fieldwork Peter Hakim Justin 
fairer division of resources, or part of political 
strategizing and electoral competition? Whose in-
terests and agendas does it serve? 
• Decentralizing land governing authority without 
rights, finances and real decision-taking authority 
may have limited impact. Decentralization should 
go along with harnessing existing protection mech-
anisms, rather than aiming at reform those. 
•  More research should be conducted at the local 
level on how decentralization policies work out, 
notably in terms of enhancing tenure security of 
small land users. 
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Governance – Land conflicts, local governance and decen-
tralization in post-conflict Uganda, Burundi, and South Su-
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studied how land disputes and land governance evolve in 
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this implies for state-citizen relationships, the legitimacy and 
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of land conflicts. Seminars in Entebbe, Kampala, and Juba, in 
May 2015, brought together academics, development practi-
tioners and government officials from the region to discuss 
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infosheets. 
 
'Grounding Land Governance' is a collaboration of African 
Studies Centre; Institute of Interdisciplinary Training and 
Research, Mbarara University of Science & Technology, 
Uganda; Centre for International Conflict Analysis & Man-
agement, Radboud University Nijmegen; Disaster Studies, 
Wageningen University; and a series of other institutes and 
NGOs. The programme is funded by NWO-WOTRO Science 
for Global Development. 
 
Authors: 
Mathijs van Leeuwen, ASC/CICAM Radboud University Nij-
megen – m.vanleeuwen@fm.ru.nl 
Doreen Kobusingye, ASC – kobsdoris@yahoo.com 
Peter Hakim Justin, ASC – logoro28@gmail.com 
Rosine Tchatchoua Djomo, ASC – tdrosine@yahoo.fr 
Han van Dijk, ASC/Wageningen University – 
dijkh@ascleiden.nl 
 
Contact:  
African Studies Centre, Leiden University 
PO Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands 
+31 (0)71 527 3372/76 www.ascleiden.nl 
